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REMARKS
HON. BRIAN WALSH
I have carefully examined the title of this seminar,
"International Human Rights Before Domestic Courts,"1 and I
believe that the term "international human rights" is incorrect.
Human rights are inherent in man, irrespective of his national-
ity or origins.
The Charter of the United Nations2 (the "Charter") con-
tains a provision ordering all member States to defend human
rights.3 The Charter, however, failed to define the human rights
and fundamental freedoms it sought to protect.4 It was the Uni-
' This Symposium took place at St. John's University School of Law on October
1, 1994. The panel, headed by Judge Edward D. Re, consisted of Hon. Antonio Bran-
caccio, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy; Hon. Pierre Drai, Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of Cassation of France; Hon. Luis Octavio Gallotti, Chief
Justice, Supreme Court of Brazil; Hon. Giovanni E. Longo, President of Division,
Supreme Court of Cassation of Italy; Hon. Youssoupha Nidaye, Chief Justice, Con-
stitutional Court of The Republic of Senegal; and Hon. Brian Walsh, Justice of The
European Court of Human Rights, Former Justice, Supreme Court of Ireland.
2 U.N. CHARTER. The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Fran-
cisco on June 26, 1945. LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 8 (3d ed. 1969). See generally id. at 1-17
(discussing historical development of United Nations). THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (same). The Charter declared its members' com-
mon intentions to be:
[T]o save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small....
U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. Article 1 provides that "promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language or religion" should be a goal of all states. Id. Fur-
thermore, Article 55 calls on the United Nations to promote "universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion...." Id. at art. 55, para. c; see also MARK W.
JANIS & RIcHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15 (1990) (discussing U.N.
Charter).
4 See John P. Humphrey, THE REVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HuMAN RIGHTS, 4 HuM. RTS. 205, 207-08 (1975).
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versal Declaration of Human Rights (the "Universal Declara-
tion")6 which defined those rights,' but it contained no machinery
for enforcing them.7 Enforcement was piously left to each mem-
ber State to act in accordance with the Universal Declaration.8
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights9 (the
"European Court"), to which I currently belong, was established
to protect some of the human rights addressed in the Universal
Declaration. From a philosophical point of view, the Universal
Declaration broke away from positivist philosophy." The positiv-
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(IH), U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 165 (1993) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
The Universal Declaration enumerates generally accepted principles concerning
human rights norms in international law. JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 15. Article
2 of the Universal Declaration states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Decla-
ration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.
Universal Declaration, supra, art. 2, para. 1. These principles were approved by the
unanimous vote of the General Assembly of the United Nations and were later codi-
fied by the convention and covenant. See Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of In-
ternational Human Rights, 27 AKRON L. REV. 281, 283-84 (1994). See generally
Human Rights, 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 524, U.N. Doc. S/INF/2 (describing U.N. actions
regarding Universal Declaration and its codification).
'See Humphrey, supra note 4, at 207-08 ("It can be said that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights authentically defines those human rights and funda-
mental freedoms which member states of the United Nations undertook to respect
and observe by the charter but which the charter itself does not define.").
7 JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing lack of mechanism to enforce
rules against recalcitrant states).
8Id.
9 See generally JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 87-116 (discussing purpose of
European Court of Human Rights); FREDE CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Torkel Opsahl & Thomas Duchterlony eds., 1974). The Euro-
pean Court was established by Article 19 of the European Convention of Human
Rights to "ensure the observation of the engagements undertaken by The High Con-
tracting Parties in the present convention." Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
European Convention].
'8 There are two traditional ways of analyzing fundamental human rights. Wil-
liam Binchy, Constitutional Remedies and the Law of Torts, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 201, 219 (James O'Reilly ed., 1992). The posivitist approach
views rights as capable of generation only within particular legal orders. Id. The
natural law approach, on the other hand, regards fundamental human rights as in-
hering in all human beings. Id.; see also NEIL MCCORMICK & OTA WEINBERGER, AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LAW - NEW APPROACHES TO LEGAL POSITIVISM 127-28
(1986) (comparing natural law to positive law).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The Charter of the United Na-
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ist school of thought acknowledged that man has certain rights,
not because they are inherent, but solely because they are given
to him by the State.1 This break was important because the
positivist philosophy flourished in Europe and other English-
speaking countries with the exception of the United States. 2 As
Jeremy Bentham" said: "Rights are the fruits of the law and of
the law alone; there are no rights without the law-no rights
contrary to law-no rights anterior to law."4 Nevertheless, the
Universal Declaration departed from this theory. 5
There was nothing terribly new about this approach because
the American Declaration of Independence spoke of "unalienable
rights." 6 Similarly, the French Declaration of Rights spoke of
the "natural and imprescriptable rights of man."7  Thus, we
know that man has rights.
It has not always been possible, however, to enforce these
rights in domestic courts. In fact, until the establishment of the
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (the "European Convention"), 8 an individual had no re-
tions set forth principles that became part of both international law and "internal"
positive law in that they entitled the state to protect its subjects. MIEcZYsLAW
MANEH, JURDICIAL PosITMsm AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1981).
The traditional positivist theory, however, limited the access of pnvate indi-
viduals to international legal process. JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 10.
" See MCCORMACK & WEINBERGER, supra note 10, at 127-28. "he legal positiv-
ist proceeds from the assumption that the law is a constituent element of social real-
ity, in other words, that it exists as an institutional fact which is to be grasped and
explained by legal science ..... Id. at 116 (emphasis omitted). Thus, individuals could
not assert international legal rights against states. JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 9.
" Binchy, supra note 10, at 219 ("Most countries do not adhere ... [to] the natu-
ral law approach."). Some countries, like England, are fundamentally opposed to
the natural law theory and support the positivist approach. Id.
"Jeremy Bentham was one of the founders of modern juridicial positivism.
MANEH, supra note 10, at 9.
1'4 JEREMY BENTHAM, 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 221 (1843), micro-
formed on Rothman Reprints 1985, Fiche 79 (Littleton Co.); see also KEEKOK LEE,
THE LEGAL-RATIONAL STATE 142 (1990).
"s See HUMPHREY, supra note 4, at 207-08 ("[T]he Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights authentically defines those human rights and fundamental freedoms
which member states of the United Nations undertook to respect and observe....");
see also JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 10.
16 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). When a govern-
ment is guilty of destroying "certain unalienable Rights," it is the right and duty of
the people to abolish and replace that government. Id.
'7 The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France 1789), re-
printed in EDWARD LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 591 (1991).
8 European Convention, supra note 9. Under the European Convention, any
case submitted to the European Court of Human Rights originates through applica-
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course for the enforcement of these rights in an international fo-
rum. The international court, like the International Court of
Justice in the Hague,19 confined its adjudication to matters be-
tween States. Thus, no individual could appear or present a
case.' ° Today, however, he can do so in Strasbourg."
The European Convention22 was completed roughly around
1950. Keeping in mind the significance of the title, the European
Convention speaks of human rights and fmdamental freedoms,'
thereby acknowledging that not all fundamental freedoms are
necessarily human rights. This is important, because if one rec-
ognizes certain rights as being antecedent and superior to all
positive law, then those rights are out of law's reach. In many
cases, the European Convention does interfere with established
tion to the European Commission. The European Commission determines the ad-
missability of the application by verifying that all domestic remedies have been ex-
hausted and that the application was submitted within six months of the date of the
decision by the state courts. JANIS & KAY supra note 3, at 42-43. If the application is
admitted, the European Commission attempts to have the parties reach a settle-
ment. If an agreement cannot be reached, the Europen Commission files a report
stating whether the state violated the norms of the European Convention. This re-
port is then submitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The
European Commission may then refer the case to the European Court of Human
Rights. See VINCENT BERGER, CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1, 2-3 (1989); see also DAVID KINLEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPLIANCE WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1993) (discussing role of
European Convention in advancement of human rights).
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), which is located at the Hague, is
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 1992 I.C.J 46, at 1. The ICJ was
preceded by the Permanent Court of International Justice. Martin M. Strahan, Nu-
clear Weapons, The World Health Organization, and The International Court of Jus-
tice: Should an Advisory Opinion Bring Them Together?, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 395, 408 n.1 (1995).
Only states are given the right to bring suit in ICJ; individuals have no direct
access. JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 10. But see Stephen. Schwebel, Preliminary
Rulings By the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts, 28
VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1988) (suggesting widening access to ICJ).
20 Private citizens' right of access has played a significant role in developing the
system of European human rights law. JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 93.
Until recently, there were no guarantees of human rights at the level of inter-
national law. The prevalent philosophy of international law maintained that it was a
law for states, not individuals. Id. at 9.
2' European Convention, supra note 9, art. 25, § 1 (stating European Commis-
sion may receive petitions from any person claiming to be victim of human rights
violation).
22 See supra note 18 (discussing European Convention).
European Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. (stating that aim of European
Council is pursued through realization of "Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms").
[Vol. 70:77
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law on behalf of human rights, and the intervention is justifiable
under certain conditions. Other rights, however, may justify no
interference. 4
In Ireland, it was not difficult to get accustomed to the
European Convention because the Constitution of Ireland' was
adopted ten or eleven years before the Universal Declaration.
With respect to fundamental rights, the Constitution of Ireland
expressed that certain rights were antecedent and superior to all
positive law. 6 These include rights such as: the individual right
of freedom, rights of the family, rights of religion, and freedom of
assembly.27
Although the term "human rights" was not commonly used
when the Constitution of Ireland was adopted in 1937, the Con-
stitution did address important fundamental rights. It also ac-
knowledged, as did similar subsequent documents,' that rights
are fundamental not because they are included in the Constitu-
tion; rather, they are in the Constitution because they are fun-
damental. Both the European Convention and the Universal
Declaration echo this sentiment.
For fourteen years, I have adjudicated cases in the European
24 See generally id. The rights identified in the European Convention include the
right to life in Article 1; the right to liberty and security of person in Article 5; the
right to respect for private and family life in Article 8; the right to freedom of
thought, consciousness, and religion in Article 9; the right to freedom of expression
in Article 10; the right to assembly in Article 11; and the right to marry and found a
family in Article 12. Id.
Other rights exist which are not included in the European Convention and
therefore, are not subject to intervention by the European Court. See, e.g., U.S.
CONST. amend. II (declaring right to bear arms).
25 JR. CONST. (enacted July 1, 1937).
26 Id. at art. 41, § 1, 10 (stating that families possess inalienable rights, antece-
dent and superior to all positive law). Id. at art. 43, § 1, 10 ("Man, in virtue of his
rational being, has the natural right, antecedent to positive law, to the private own-
ership of external goods.").
27 "No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with
law." IR. CONST. art. 40, § 4, 10. "The state ... guarantees to protect the family, in its
constitution and authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensa-
ble to the welfare of the Nation and the State." Id. at art. 41, § 1. 20. "Freedom of
conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public or-
der and morality, guaranteed to every citizen." Id. at art. 44, § 2, 10. "The State
guarantees liberty for ... the right of the citizens to assemble peaceably and without
arms." Id. at art. 40, § 6, 10, ii.
23 See generally ITALY CONST. art. 2 ("The Republic recognizes and guarantees
the inviolable rights of man ... and imposes the performance of unalterable duties.");
European Convention, supra note 9, at pmbl. (reaffirming belief in fundamental
freedoms which are foundation ofjustice and peace in world).
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Court applying the rules enumerated in the European Conven-
tion.29 Although the European Convention does not seem to be
the origin of these rules," through the application of such rules,
they can be expanded to serve the function of a human right.
Most importantly, the European Convention presented one
of the first attempts in history to allow an individual to come be-
fore an international tribunal with a claim against his own coun-
try or against any other country.31 Article 1 of the European
Convention makes every member State responsible to any person
in the jurisdiction, regardless of his nationality.32 Thus, each
individual is entitled to the protection of the provisions, and the
State is made accountable.
When the European Convention was originally published,
the member States only agreed to be bound as States. A special
protocol, however, which was ultimately adopted by every mem-
ber State, gave individuals the right of petition.33 An American
citizen present in any one of the member States could therefore
impeach the government of that country if his protected rights
were violated. The right to individual petition is not limited to
citizens of the member State.
The European Court heard a rather spectacular murder case
from the United States in which one of the accused took refuge
in Great Britain.34 The European Court intervened before Great
See European Convention, supra note 9, arts. 2-14.
o See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating freedom of religion, speech, and
peaceable assembly); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) ("We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men ... are endowed by their creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness."); MAGNA CARTA art. 39 (stating no free man shall be seized, imprisoned,
or stripped of his possessions or rights, except by lawful judgment).
"' European Convention, supra note 9, art. 25, § 1; see also JANIS & KAY, supra
note 3, at 9 (explaining that until relatively recently, individuals were thought to
have no international legal rights which they could individually assert against
states); Humphrey, supra note 4, at 208 (stating that new international law of hu-
man rights purports to protect rights of individuals).
32 European Convention, supra note 9, art. 1 ("The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section I of this Convention.").
Id. at art. 25, § 1. Article 25 was originally an optional clause, but as of Janu-
ary 1, 1990, all the member states accepted the right of individual petition. JANIS &
KAY, supra note 3, at 36.
3 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). Soering, a West
German National, confessed to committing two homicides in Virginia while under
arrest in England for check fraud. Id. at 13. In June, 1986, a grand jury in Virginia
indicted Soering on charges of capital murder. Id. On August 11, 1986, the United
[Vol. 70:77
Britain could extradite him to the United States to face a capital
charge. The European Court could not intervene merely because
it was a capital charge. Although all European countries have
abolished the death sentence," it is not forbidden by the Euro-
pean Convention." The European Court could intervene, how-
ever, under Article 3,37 which deals with what you might call
"inhuman degrading treatment." The European Court concluded
that it was inhumane treatment to spend seven, eight, or nine
years on death row and therefore, such treatment could not be
permitted.
In the end, the United States Government (with some diffi-
culty because these matters are within each member State's
authority) informed Great Britain that the death penalty would
not be applied." The accused was extradited, tried, and sen-
tenced. Some might think this is not much different from an
execution. Nevertheless, the case serves as an outstanding ex-
ample of an intervention by the European Court.
The same decision mentioned that a similar view might be
taken in the extradition case if the local national procedure of a
particular member State violated provisions of the Convention.39
States Government requested his extradition. Id. at 14.
European Convention, supra note 9, art. 2, § 1 (providing that no one shall be
deprived of life intentionally, save in execution of sentence following conviction of
crime for which death penalty is provided by law).
" See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 636 (1994) (citing virtual con-
sensus in Western European legal systems that death penalty is, under current cir-
cumstances, no longer consistent with regional standards of justice); WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 214
(1993) (stating that entire continent of Europe has virtually abolished death pen-
alty). Yet, one party to the European Convention, Turkey, continues to impose the
death penalty. However, because Turkey has not imposed the death penalty since
accepting Article 25 in 1987, the European Court has that found the death penalty
no longer exists de facto in any of the contracting states of the European Conven-
tion. Id. at 213.
17 European Convention, supra note 9, art. 3 ("No one shall be subjected to tor-
ture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
' See Richard B. Lillich, Note, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 141
(1991). The British Government received assurances from the U.S. that no capital
murder charge would be brought. Soering was convicted of first degree murder was
sentenced to serve two life terms. Id.
39 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 120 (1989), reprinted
in 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 481 (1989) ("Article 13 guarantees the availability of a
remedy at national level to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and free-
doms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal or-
der.").
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That situation has never actually come before the European
Court. The European Court frequently encounters the most
common assertions, such as freedom of religion and freedom of
expression."
Recently the European Court has had an interesting case
against Austria.4 The complainant alleged it had produced a
film and was advertising fabulously. It was the film version of a
play that had been written about 100 years ago,42 but all that
was at issue here was the particular film production.4  A pro-
duction can make a significant difference to a piece. This film
depicted God as a dottering old man in league with the devil, the
blessed Virgin as immoral and wanton, and Jesus Christ as an-
other low-grade mental defective."
The freedom of expression contained in Article 10 of the
European Convention was invoked.45 Article 9 of the European
41 See, e.g., Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs & Gubi v. Aus-
tria, 302 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), reprinted in 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1994)
(deciding whether magazine critical of military was protected by right to freedom of
expression); Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) (1994), re-
printed in 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995) (deciding whether transfer of monastic prop-
erty to State violated right to freedom of religion).
41 Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), reprinted in
19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994).
42 The author of the original play, Oskar Panizza, was imprisoned in 1895 in
Germany for crimes against religion. Id. at 40; see Human Rights Court Rejects Film
Protest, UPI, Sept. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (reporting
decision); David Pannick, When Blasphemy and Free Speech Collide, LONDON
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database (explaining context
in which case arose). The film in question was "Council in Heaven" or
"Liebeskonzil," directed by Weiner Schroeter.
43 See Otto-Preminger Inst., 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 40 (recognizing that only film
was prosecuted).
4Id.; see Pannick, supra note 42 (stating same).
4* Article 10 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcast-
ing, television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and re-
sponsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic soci-
ety, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for pre-
venting the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for main-
taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 9, art. 10.
[Vol. 70:77
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Convention deals with freedom of religion and respect for one's
religion and religious beliefs.46 On the one hand, there is an ar-
gument in favor of freedom of expression. The European Court,
of course, said that one is perfectly free to challenge another's
religious views. Nonetheless, the possibility of insulting an-
other's religious beliefs with the result of inhibiting others from
exercising their right to free practice of religion was a dominant
concern.48 The holding of the European Court is quite significant
considering that the God in question is the God not merely of the
Jewish and the Islamic people, but of the Christian people as
well. With ramifications possible throughout the world, the de-
cision could easily give rise to public disorder, which is one of the
reasons in favor of an intervention.
That situation marked the first time the European Court
ever heard such a case.49 The case was not based on blasphemy;
but rather on the fact that the film would have an inhibiting ef-
fect on the free practice of religion of those millions of people who
believe in the religious principles degraded by the film.0 No one
is forced to believe in religion. But if they do, that belief must be
respected.
I should add that the European Convention has not been
adopted as part of the domestic law by a majority of the thirty-
'r Article 9 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, ei-
ther alone or in community with others and in public or private, to mani-
fest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic so-
ciety in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 9, art. 9.
41 One commentator notes several arguments in favor of freedom of expression
in such a case. See Pannick, supra note 42 (criticizing oppression of free expression
of ideas). First, Pannick notes that the goal of freedom of expression is to allow the
public to determine the value of a work for themselves. Id. Second, the value of the
freedom of expression is diminished if it precludes expression which upsets some
people. Id. Third, a minority view such as that expressed in the film needs special
protection so as not to be smothered by the opinions of those in the majority. Id.
Fourth, ridicule, as expressed in the film, is a meaningful form of expression. Id.
41 See Otto-Preminger Inst., 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 46.
49 See Otto-Preminger Inst., 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 45.
5" But see Pannick, supra note 42 (suggesting that case will set course of Court
in deciding "blasphemous" expression cases in future).
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three member States." One reason is that in certain areas, the
national law of the member State provides better protection than
the European Convention. Secondly, in many countries, includ-
ing Ireland, no international treaty can become part of the law of
the land unless Parliament expressly adopts it.5" Other coun-
tries, such as Holland and Germany, will to some extent auto-
matically set international treaties into the law. 3 For example,
under the present Dutch Constitution, one is forbidden to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of any Dutch law in the courts of
Holland.54 However, a challenge to the constitutionality of the
" The members of the Council of Europe who originally ratified the European
Convention include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2d ed.
1990) (listing original member nations); JANIS & KAY, supra note 3, at 31-32
(discussing negotiation of European Convention).
52 See, e.g., IR. CONST. art. 29, § 6 ("No international agreement shall be part of
the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas.").
53 See NETH. CONST. art. 93 ("Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by inter-
national institutions, which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents
shall become binding after they have been published."); see also E.A. Alkema, Con-
stitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW FOR FOREIGN LAWYERS 264
(J.M.J. Chorus et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993); CONSTANTIJN A.J.M. KORTMANN & PAUL
P.T. BOVEND'EERT, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
DUTCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-59 (1993) ("Standards laid down in treaties are
automatically applicable within the national system of law with no need for trans-
formation order.").
The German Constitution provides that any international law or treaty auto-
matically becomes part of German law. Andre M. Surena, et al., Extraterritorial Ap-
plication of Criminal Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 383, 386 (1991); see Antonio
La Pergola & Patrick Del Duca, Community Law, International Law, and the Italian
Constitution, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 598, 621 n.56 (1985).
Article 100(2) of the German Constitution contains a system of direct application
of international law rights [to domestic law]. It provides [that] "if ... doubt exists
whether a rule of public international law is an integral part of federal law and
whether such rule directly creates rights and duties for the individual ... , the court
shall obtain a decision from the Fedral Constitutional Court." Id. Article 25 of the
Constitution even requires that public international law take precedence over Ger-
man national law. Carson T. Ebenroth & Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., Gaining the Com-
petetive Edge: Access to the European Market Through Bilateral Commercial Trea-
ties and Taxation Strategies, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269, 278 (1993).
"' See NETH. CONST. art. 120 ("The constitutionality of acts of parliament and
treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts.").
The constitutional provision which precludes judicial review dates back to 1848,
and creates the supremacy of the Dutch Parliament with respect to interpretation of
the Constitution. KORTMANN & BOVEND'EERT, supra note 53, at 118. Recent deci-
sions in the Dutch courts have interpreted this section broadly to mean that judicial
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law can be made if the law breaches an international treaty.55
This is a practice which is in contradiction with virtually every
other country, but it provides an example of how one country ap-
proaches the adoption of international treaties.
Article 5, in particular, contains a provision stating that any
person arrested on the reasonable suspicion of having committed
a criminal offense must be promptly brought before a judge."
This provision has been interpreted liberally by the European
Court, which has tolerated a number of days as being "prompt."57
This interpretation has been greatly influenced by the local cus-
toms of European countries. There are different cultural atti-
tudes with respect to Article 5. For example, in Ireland, it would
be unacceptable if an arrested individual is not brought before a
judge within a matter of hours. The proceeding becomes uncon-
stitutional and any statement or admission the individual makes
is automatically excluded even if the statements or admissions
are true." The purpose of requiring that a defendant promptly
review of laws may not be tested under the Constitution. See id. (noting that Neth-
erlands' highest court broadened prohibition of judicial review by applying it to
Dutch Constitution and Charter for Kingdom of Netherlands).
See NETH. CONST. art. 94 ("Statutory regulations in force within the Kingdom
shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict with provisions of treaties or
of resolutions by international institutions that are binding on all persons.").
Articles 120 and 94 lead to sharp contrasts because the Dutch courts may review
laws for violations of human rights provisions enunciated in binding international
treaties, but cannot review such laws under similar human rights provisions in the
Dutch Constitution. This dual standard of judicial review has been criticized as an
"anomaly" and has inspired Royal Commissions in the Netherlands to prepare re-
vised drafts of the Constitution. However, the Parliament has rejected such
changes. Alkema, supra note 53, at 241, 270-71; see also KORTMANN & BoV-
END'EERT, supra note 53, at 158-60 (contrasting judicial review under Articles 120
and 94).56 European Convention, supra note 9, art. 5, § 3.
57 See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in
11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 117 (1988). The Brogan Court held that a period of four days and
six hours without being brought before a judge violated Article 5, Section 3. Id. at
135-36. The European Court has refused to fix a specific time frame with regards to
"promptly," but commentators have suggested that a detention for up to a period of
four days is acceptable. See S. Trechsel, Liberty and Security of Person, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 277, 336 (R. St. J. Mac-
donald et al. eds., 1993).
' See People v. O'Brien, 1965 I.R. 142 (Ir. S.C.) (explaining that evidence ob-
tained in deliberate breach of constitutional rights, i.e. illegal arrest, is inadmissable
save extraordinary circumstances); see also IR. CONST. art. 40, para. 2 (providing for
mandatory release of persons if their detention cannot be reasonably justified);
Criminal Justice Act, No. 22, § 26 (1984), in 1984-1986 Ir. Current Law Stat. 22-01,
22-40 (requiring that "a person arrested ... shall ... be brought be brought before a
justice ... as soon as practicable"); People v. Shaw, 1982 I.R. 1, 30-31 (Ir. S.C.)
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appear before a judge is so that the judge can examine the physi-
cal condition of the prisoner.59 If the prisoner has spent eight
days in custody, all his bruises may have worn off, or his black
eye may have whitened again.
Article 5 of the European Convention also lays down a pro-
vision which states that there must be a legal possibility of
challenging the validity of the law for unlawful detention." This
challenge does not take place the first time that the prisoner ap-
pears before the judge."
Article 5 also guarantees an accused a trial within a reason-
(stating that person arrested who is not brought before court within reasonable time
is subjected to unlawful imprisonment thus affecting admissibility of evidence);
People v. O'Loughlin, 1979 I.R. 85, 89 (Ir. S.C.) ("Undoubtedly, unlawful detention is
a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, ... [but) in the exercise of my
discretion, I can admit such statement in evidence."); cf. People v. Lynch, 1982 I.R.
64, 79 (Ir. S.C.) (stating that inadmissibility of evidence due to illegal arrest applies
to confessions as well).
Generally, the detained individual must be brought before a judge within sev-
eral hours after arrest; however, there are statutory provisions which allow special
circumstances for night arrests. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, No. 22, § 15 (1984),
in 1984-1986 Ir. Current Law Stat. 22-01, 22-40. The actual exclusion of evidence,
however, is a discretionary device left up to the trial judge. See generally JAMES
CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 390-91 (1992) (explaining procedure for
detention following arrest); CAROLINE FENNELL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN IRELAND
51-70 (1992) (discussing admissibility of illegally obtained evidence).
"9 See Trechsel, supra note 57, at 333 (describing need to find evidence of mal-
treatment, especially in states where danger of police brutality or torture exist); see
also Helen Cook, Preventative Detention-International Standards and the Protection
of the Individual, in PREVENTIVE DETENTION 1, 29 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Dinah
Shelton eds., 1992) (explaining that procedure guards against torture and other
abuses directed against prisoners).
60 European Convention, supra note 9, art. 5, § 4 ("Everyone who is deprived of
his liberty ... shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his de-
tention shall be decided by a court... ."). Generally speaking, Article 5, section 4 cre-
ates the right to a habeas corpus proceeding. See generally Treschel, supra note 57,
at 319.
61 Cf. De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. The Netherlands, 77 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1984), reprinted in 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20, 39-40 (1984) (stating that section 4
habeas corpus proceedings necessarily run concurrently with initial proceeding un-
der section 3). It follows that there must be access to a section 4 proceeding from the
time the detainee "was or ought to have been brought before" the initial proceeding
and in reasonable intervals thereafter; moreover, the initial proceeding does not
create a de facto section 4 access. Id. However, the investigative judge from the Ar-
ticle 5, section 3 proceeding is not precluded from participating in future habeas
corpus proceedings. See Bezicheri v. Italy, 164 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), re-
printed in 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 210, 211-12 (1990) (investigating judge allowed to de-
cide later application under section 4). But cf Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, 50
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982), reprinted in 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 443, 443 (1982) (stating
that initial tribunal used in future proceeding under section 4 must be empowered
to order release in order not to violate section 4).
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able time.62 This is also an important matter in many cases
coming before the European Court. There have been some cases
before us where the trial was not completed after fourteen years.
Generally speaking, the European Court would regard any case
that was not completed within about two and a half or three
years as a breach of the Article.63
Article 6, which deals with the conduct of trials, adopts the
presumption of innocence.' This causes confusion in some
European minds, even in Great Britain. In Ireland, we have
quite a different approach. The presumption of innocence is
taken quite literally and applied not only to the trial, but to
every stage of the criminal process from the moment of arrest."
Under Irish law, no person can be denied bail for any offense,
including murder, unless it can be proven that there is a prob-
ability that the prisoner will attempt to escape or interfere with
the course of justice.66 Irish law would regard the denial of bail
as a breach of the presumption of innocence, even if employed as
a preventative measure, because the denial assumes that the
0 European Convention, supra note 9, art. 5, § 3.
6 Cf. W v. Switzerland, 254 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (holding that detention
of four years and three days does not violate article 5(3)). The European Court has
not fixed a specific time interval but has instead created tests involving the inter-
pretation of "reasonable time." Id. at 30.
6 European Convention, supra note 9, art. 6, § 2 ("Everyone charged ... shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law."); see also Barbera, Messe-
gue, and Jabardo v. Spain, 146 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 77 (1988) ("Paragraph 2 em-
bodies the principle of presumption of innocence. It requires ... the members of the
court should not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed
the offence.").
c- See, e.g., People v. O'Callaghan, 1966 I.R. 501, 508 (Ir. S.C.) ("[Our system of
law] transcends respect for the requirement that a man shall be considered innocent
until he is found guilty... ."); People v. O'Leary, 1991 I.L.R.M. 454, 458 (Ir. S.C.).
The presumption of innocence stems from the common law and has always been
part of Irish law. In People v. O'Leary, the Irish Supreme Court recognized the uni-
versal view of the presumption of innocence in accord with common law and various
international human rights instruments. The presumption of innocence has been
implicit in the Irish Constitution much like the United States Supreme Coures view
in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See CASEY, supra note 58, at 413-14.
" See O'Callaghan, 1966 I.R. at 509. The O'Callaghan Court re-affi-med the
principle that there is a strong presumption of bail in accord with the presumption
of innocence. The O'Callaghan Court also stated that the fundamental test for not
granting bail is the probability of evading justice, id. at 513, and that the factors to
be examined in the course of the test include the probability of attempted escape
and the likelihood of interfering with justice by destroyed evidence, id. at 514-15; see
also People v. Ryan, 1989 I.R. 399 (Ir. S.C.) (reiterating principles stated in
O'Callaghan). See generally CASEY, supra note 58, at 393-95; BRIAN DOOLAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN IRELAND 201-02 (1994).
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prisoner has committed the offense.
In some cases before the European Court in Strasbourg,
people have been held in custody for seven years while the case
was being investigated. My views regarding this matter have
not always concurred with those of my colleagues, but fortu-
nately, in the European Court, dissenting opinions are also pub-
lished.
A very important part of a fair trial is controlling the public-
ity. There are very few instances in which it is possible to have a
case tried outside of the public eye. Court decisions must be
pronounced publicly," even in the case of prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings. 8 In some prisons, when a person goes to jail with a ten
year sentence, a notice may be posted on the cell door indicating
that, with good behavior, the prisoner will be released in six or
seven years. Cases before the European Court have held that
prison disciplinary procedures which result in the loss of pris-
oner's remission are the equivalent of being sentenced again, and
therefore cannot be done without an independent hearing within
the prison or before some other tribunal. The decision must be
pronounced in public, even when security requires that the
hearing should not be in public. In other words, the remission of
five or six years of a long sentence cannot be taken away for a
breach of discipline unless there has been a full hearing in ac-
cord with Article 6.69 A person is always entitled to a full hear-
ing and the right to cross examine a witness giving evidence
against him.
Although these cases may appear unimportant, they are im-
portant in principle. Many landmark decisions have occurred in
comparatively unimportant cases. Thus, if you neglect the
6' European Convention, supra note 9, art. 6, § 1. Article 6 allows the preclusion
of the press and the public from all or some aspects of the trial procedure; however,
all "Uludgement shall be pronounced publicly[.]" Id. The European Court has taken
the position that it is not bound to adopt a literal translation of the Article 6 public-
ity provisions. See Sutter v. Switzerland, 74 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1984).
68 See Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 89-92
(1984) (stating that failure of prison to publicly announce its decision was violation
of Article 6).
'9 See id. Campbell was an ad hoc prison disciplinary case in which the prisoner
was denied legal representation and the right to appear at the proceeding. The
European Court held that the remission of the prisoner's sentence which was denied
at the outcome of the proceeding was within the "criminal sphere" for the purposes
of Article 6; therefore, the lack of due process at the proceedings violated Article 6.
Id. at 68-70.
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smaller case and swallow the principle, you are going to endan-
ger the great cases.
Certain restrictions upon rights are permitted by the Euro-
pean Court if they are necessary to democracy and jurispru-
dence. There is a doctrine called "The Margin of Appreciation of
the State."" In certain areas, if the state has created a restric-
tion, this doctrine allows the European Court to give deference to
the State and say, "[t]he State in a particular case is probably a
better judge, and we will allow this [restriction] provided it does
not go to some excess." The only trouble with the Margin of Ap-
preciation is that it remains tied to the old law of Chancellor's
foot.7 It tends to vary in its application creating a degree of un-
70 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is a general approach by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in which it balances the diversity of Europe's cultures,
law, and political systems with the European Convention and Protocols. The aim of
the doctrine is to allow states some discretion since the European Convention has
an impact upon matters of domestic law. See R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of
Appreciation, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 57 at 83-89; J.G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 151-53 (1993); Youron, The Margin of
Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 3
CONN. J. INT'L L. 111 (1987). The doctrine of the margin of appreciation derives
from Article 15 which permits derogation from the European Convention in times of
emergency. See Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1961). The doctrine is
"the primary tool of the Court in ensuring the efficacy of the application of Articles 8
to 11, 14 and 15" and, more recently, in the "context of Article 5." Macdonald, supra
at 72. The doctrine "goes hand in hand with a European supervision ... [which] con-
cerns both the aim of' the legislation and judicial decision of the state in the con-
tested violation. Handyside v. The United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49
(1976). Moreover, the width of the application of the doctrine varies on a case by
case basis. See MERRILLS, supra.
"1 The term "chancellor's foot" derives from the spirited rebuke of Selden in re-
sponse to the seemingly unbounded jurisdiction of the Chancery. 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 19-20 (1918).
For law we have a measure, and know what to trust to. Equity is according
to the conscience of him that is chancellor, and as that is larger or nar-
rower, so is equity. T is all one as if they should make the standard for the
measure the chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be!
One chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent
foot. It is the same thing with the chancellor's conscience.
Id. The term "chancellor's foot" refers to the judicial discretion within the Courts of
Equity and the lack of principles which guided the chancellors at the end of the fif-
teenth century. The lack of fixed equitable principles or precedents gave the chan-
cellors discretion in applying the right rule by the dictates of the chancellor's own
sense of right or wrong. See WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREASISE ON EQUITY 41 (1930).
See generally WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed. 1956);
HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (2d ed. 1948);
Zygmunt Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524
(1982); Russ Winner, The Chancellor's Foot and Environmental Law: A Call for Bet-
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certainty.
There are presently thirty-three European countries in the
Council of Europe and twelve in the European Union. Recently,
we have seen the development of a vast number of countries in
Eastern Europe. I have been visiting some of these countries,
some of which have only come into existence a few years ago. I
can tell you that the constitutional courts have become a growth
industry in Eastern Europe. Every country has them and they
all subscribe to the European Convention. These countries have
not been around long enough to enable the European Court to
hear any cases from them. Normally, a country is a member for
several years before a case even reaches us. The general im-
pression is that the Eastern European countries will liberally in-
terpret human rights, and that these countries desire to conform
to what they believe is the requirement of natural law. This re-
mains to be seen, but it would be a very interesting development.
One must bear in mind that the Preamble to the European
Convention speaks of countries with a similar tradition.72 In
other words, the European Court was set up to reflect Western
European traditions, which have a strong background in natural
law. I am not saying that natural law is absent in Eastern
European countries, but the traditions have now extended to the
frontiers of the old Roman Empire.
What do we do with a country like Russia, which is currently
trying to become a member of the European Convention? That
would launch us out to Vladivastok, which is a long way from
Western Europe. First, there would be political difficulties, be-
cause each country has a certain number of representatives in
the Parliamentary Assembly. The population of the Russian Re-
public alone would entitle Russia to almost half the seats in the
Parliamentary Assembly. Secondly, we cannot honestly say that
Western European countries have a common tradition with any-
thing in Eastern Europe, much less with Vladivostak. As far as I
know, Vladivostak's only European connection is that it was
ter Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477 (1979).
72 See European Convention, supra note 9 ("Being resolved, as the Governments
of European countries which are likeminded and have a common heritage of politi-
cal traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, [we agree] to take the first steps
for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Decla-
ration[.]"); Detlev Vajts & Christina M. Cerna, Laws, Rights and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 798 (1987) (noting aims of conven-
tion are to protect identity of Western Europe).
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founded by a Norwegian a long time ago.
The European Court has played a very important part in all
of the countries in Europe. Although many governments dislike
some of the decisions made by the European Court, it has be-
come politically impossible for any court, or country, to circum-
vent these decisions because they cover such a wide variety of
human life. This has caught the public eye; the newspapers
have given us a great amount of publicity.
Some countries only signed up to be members for a number
of years; others signed up forever. It has been our experience
with countries whose memberships are expiring, that by popular
demand, they renew their membership. For example, in Great
Britain, it is alleged that the Home Office of Interior Affairs is
against membership. The Foreign Office, however, which has to
face the wrath of the world outside and keep up appearances, is
in favor of the European Convention.73 On the other hand, to
give the British their due, whenever they are found at fault they
quickly rectify matters by either changing the law or changing
the procedures involved.
It should be noted that even in those countries which have
adopted the European Convention as part of their domestic law,
the number of cases coming before us has not diminished. In
many ways, in fact, the caseload has increased. League tables
indicate that a large number of cases have come from countries
like Belgium, where the European Convention has been adopted.
British lawyers tend to treat the European Court in Strasbourg
"' See Mary Ann Dadisman, The Irish Question: Into the Lion's Den, Britain
Grilled on Human Rights Issues of Northern Ireland, 21 HUM. RTS. 14 (reporting
that even though Britain is signatory of European Convention, country was con-
fronted with human rights violations it committed in Northern Ireland); Kelly D.
Talcott, Note, Question of Justice: U.S. Courts' Power of Inquiry Under Article 3(a) 3
of the Untied States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 62 NOTRE
DAiE L. REV. 474,485 (1987) ("The United Kingdom has recognized and has agreed
to respect those rights and freedoms listed in the European Convention on Human
Rights. However, the system of justice that Great Britain has implemented in
Northern Ireland significantly abridges these supposedly recognized rights... .").
Though Great Britain is a signatory of the Convention and allows its citizens access
to the European Court, Dadisman, supra, at 76, it has not thus far incorporated the
European Convention into its domestic law. Donald M. McRae et al., Proceedings of
the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 85
AM. SOCY INt L. PROC. 132 (1991). Additionally, it has refused to sign the Euro-
pean Convention's voluntary protocol on renouncing death as a punishment. George
P. Fletcher, Searching For the Rule of Law in the Wake of Communism, 1992 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 145, 158.
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as a constitutional court for Great Britain;74 consequently, we get
a large number of cases from them. For various reasons, the
United Kingdom is always at the top of the league. One reason
is because there is no written constitution in Britain,"m and sec-
ondly, there is no court of ultimate constitutional jurisdiction.76
President Longo spoke of court procedure and the impartial
administration of justice.77 We have developed a distinction be-
tween what we call personal impartiality and structural impar-
tiality. Structural impartiality occurs when we have a tribunal,
e.g., an administrative tribunal, and one member of the tribunal
is really subordinate to the person involved."8 We instantly hold
that the tribunal is not structurally impartial. Such a situation
would arise if the case before us involved the decision of the head
of a department, and a subordinate of that department was a
member of the tribunal. We have had quite a few of these cases.
We have moved under Article 6 into a field, which France
regards as quite separate, of administrative law.79 Our position
4 See Mauro Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Le-
gitimacy of 'Constitutional Justice', 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (1985) (noting that
Great Britain has always willingly complied with decisions of European Court).
' See JESSE MACY, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY ON ITS
NATURE AND GROWTH 11-16 (1988) (noting that English Constitution is based on
series of theories, ideas, and English history rather than on written document).
76 The highest court of appeal for cases arising in Great Britain is the House of
Lords, which is composed of the upper house of the British Parliament. MACY, supra
note 75, at 40, 96-97. The Privy Council is the court of last appeal for cases arising
outside the United Kingdom, for example in the colonies of Britain. Id. at 97. Both
courts, therefore, are courts of final appeal, and whether a case is appealed to one or
the other depends on the geographical location in which it arises. Id. at 98. Unlike
the courts of America, however, these courts are powerless to strike down any legis-
lative act as violative of the Constitution of England. Id. at 94.
77 Giovanni E. Longo, Human Right to an Independent Judiciary: International
Norms and Denied Application Before A Domestic Jurisdiction, 69 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 113 (1996).
78 Personal impartiality, on the other hand, would involve a case in which a
member of the tribunal, serving in his personal capacity, had a particular national
interest or bias regarding a case before the court. See Jorge Cicero, The Alien Tort
Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for Injuries to Foreign Nationals Hosted by the United
States, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 315, 367, 412 n.322 (noting that members of
tribunals are required to serve in their individual capacity rather than as govern-
mental delegates, and are required to serve with impartiality regardless of national
or personal interests).
'9 Compare European Convention, supra note 9 (dealing with procedural guar-
antees of individuals in adjudication of disputes involving "the determination of his
civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him") with KAHN-
FREUND ET AL., A SOURCE BOOK ON FRENCH LAW (1991) (explaining that France
makes distinction between public law, which includes constitutional and adminis-
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is that any public law which gives rise to a private right comes
within our jurisdiction.0 However, issues such as the political
offense doctrine, separation of powers, and cases where the gov-
ernment is a party, cannot be brought before the European Court
without the consent of the signatory countries of the European
Convention.81
The two languages of the European Court are French and
English. In the French text, one speaks of action civile,82 which
means an ordinary civil party case. In the English translation,
the phrase "civil rights" is used. In fact, the European Court has
adopted the wider English definition, which has caused a lot of
consternation throughout Europe.
In the United States and Ireland, constitutional points may
be raised in any court. Many European countries, however, have
courts for the sole purpose of trying constitutional cases. Thus,
if a constitutional issue arises in an ordinary civil action in
Europe, it is shunted off to a constitutional court.
About a year ago, a civil case arose in Spain in which the
plaintiff raised a constitutional point. The case was immediately
sent off to the Spanish Constitutional Court, which finally heard
the case after a long delay.8 Under the Spanish system, plain-
tiffs are not permitted to appear in Constitutional Court proceed-
ings. The public prosecutor and the Government, however, can
both appear; Parliament can also be represented. In this case,
after everyone with an adverse interest to the plantiff's ap-
peared, the case was decided against him.
Under the Spanish system, an individual also has a right to
trative law, and private law, which governs individual rights).
8' See Katherine Freeman, The Unborn Child and the European Convention on
Human Rights: To Whom Does "Everyone's Right to Life" Belong?, 8 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 615, 621 (1994) (noting that by becoming signatories to European Convention
member states agree to be bound by European Court's jurisdiction).
8' The European Court has jurisdiction over all cases concerning the interpre-
tation of the European Convention. European Convention, supra note 9. However,
only a member state or the European Commission of Human Rights may refer a
case to the European Court, and the latter may only hear the case if the Commis-
sion is unable to settle the matter. Id.; see Kathleen M. McCauley, Women on the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights: Would Equal Representation
Provide More Effective Remedies?, 13 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 151, 157 (1994).
82 KAHN-FREUND, supra note 79, at 206.
Due to the long delay in the Spanish Constitutional Court, the plaintiff raised
a human rights issue which was heard in the European International Court. Union
Alimentaria Sanders v. Spain, 32 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 167 (1989) (finding that
plaintiffs human rights were violated under international law).
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"a plea for justice." This particular plaintiff could not succeed
with "a plea for justice" because the point he was raising as un-
just was the very one which had been decided in his absence.
Therefore, he brought the case before the European Court in
Strasbourg, much to the horror of many European constitutional
courts.
The European Court decided that when a constitutional is-
sue in a civil proceeding is brought before a Constitutional Court,
the time constraints still apply. Therefore, the Spanish Consti-
tutional Court was condemned (1) for taking too long, and; (2) for
not allowing the plaintiff to be heard. This was quite revolution-
ary, and naturally caused some dissent. Nonetheless, the de-
fense of fundamental rights overrides national structures. That
is the most important underlying concern to which the Court ad-
heres.
Strangely enough, there has never been a case under Article
2 which deals with the sanctive right.' One would have ex-
pected that an abortion case would find its way into the Euro-
pean Court based upon this right. In a case which really did not
concern abortion, an attempt was made to get a ruling on abor-
tion under the right to life contained in Article 2; however, it was
not decided by the European Court. The European Court has
been presented with cases concerning torture, ill treatment, and
other similar issues, but a case involving "the foremost of all the
human rights, the right to life," has never arisen. One of the
main reasons that this does not occur is because in an abortion
case, the abortion has probably taken place long before the case
even reaches the courts. This is even a problem in domestic
courts.
Many other cases keep coming up. Originally, like other
constitutional positions, in the early years of the European Court
virtually every case dealt with human personal rights. But in
recent years, there has been an increase in matters dealing with
property rights, because the first protocol to the European Con-
vention contains a guarantee of private property," in the same
European Convention, supra note 9. Article 2 of the Convention guarantees
that "everyone's right to life shall be protected" and mandates that one cannot be
deprived of his life unless he has first been convicted of a crime for which such a
penalty has been provided by law. Id.
"s Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1953, art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
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sense that the Irish Constitution does. It does not, however,
guarantee an individual an absolute right to all of his property.
But, as a human being, one has the right to the peaceful posses-
sion of private property. Of course, there are all kinds of limita-
tions. For example, the public good may require one to be re-
lieved of property if just compensation is given. For many years,
none of these cases came before the European Court, but they
are on the rise.
For example, some years ago the European Court was pre-
sented with a big case from Great Britain involving the Duke of
Westminster,86 who was the head landlord of almost the entire
center of London. Under English law, the Duke's lessees were
entitled to a renewal of their leases. The Duke claimed that this
was a violation of his right to private property.
The European Court looked to a United States Supreme
Court decision concerning Hawaii for guidance." The European
Court held that the renewal of leasehold was not a violation of
the constitutional right to private property. I gather the ques-
tion has not yet been settled in Hawaii, even though some years
have passed. But we referred to that case,' which, I am told,
brought some pleasure to the United States Supreme Court as a
vindication of their own view.
The human rights jurisprudence in Europe tends to be
somewhat colored by the experience of the States concerned.
Certain concepts are adopted, and often members of civil law
countries are a bit aghast if we adopt something that departs
from the established practices of the civil law in those countries.
Generally, by looking out for each country, the European
Court has built up an incredible common law of Europe. One
must bear in mind one very important thing: the European
Court of Strasbourg is a subsidiary to all the national courts. It
is not possible to come to Strasbourg until the local remedies
have been exhausted. In some cases, however, quite easily one
can prove that there are no local remedies. You do not have to
waste your time. In some European countries, it can take a long
time to exhaust local remedies and some cases are quite old be-
fore they get to the European Court. On the average, we can
hear a case and render a judgment within a year of having re-
8' James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1986).
"7 Hawaii Housing Auth v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
James, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 141.
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ceived it. Unfortunately, it often takes a case seven years to
reach us.
Nonetheless, the European Court brings to the whole popu-
lation of Europe, including Eastern Europe, the idea that a per-
son has rights. Wherever he finds himself, an individual in any
signatory country can seek redress in the local national court,
and if he does not receive satisfaction there, he can eventually
find his way to the European Court in Strasbourg.
In Strasbourg recently, there was a meeting of representa-
tives from the Indian Subcontinent-from India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nepal and others-as to whether it would be feasible
to set up a regional system in which they would have their own
"European Convention."89 It must be remembered that the
European Court is a Western European idea. It does not neces-
sarily follow that the European Court would be as successful in a
Far Eastern context, because the values that would be brought to
the system may be somewhat different. For example, the Euro-
pean Convention is individually oriented, whereas in the Far
East and India, the family holds a very important place, perhaps
more important than the individual in certain cases.
Today, there is an American Human Rights Court0 which
the United States never ratified. A system has also been set up
in Africa," with what success I cannot say. But the general idea
89 India's push for a human rights commission arose out of fear that economic
aid to the country would decrease, and came in the wake of reports from Amnesty
International and the European Parliament in Strasbourg that the country had
committed numerous human rights violations. Roy Ranjan, India: Human Rights
Commission to Set India's Record, Inter Press Service, Sept. 21, 1992, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database, File No. 2489011.
9 The United States is a signatory to the American Convention on Human
Rights ("American Convention"), but has not yet ratified the American Convention.
Andrew G. Pizor, Comment, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: The Return of Haitian
Refugees, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1062, 1114 n.370 (1994). Therefore, the United
States is therefore not bound by decisions of the Inter-American Court, which was
established by the American Convention. Id. The American Convention was created
by the Organization of American States in order to protect human rights in the
American hemisphere. Mary C. Parker, Note, "Other Treaties": The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 211,
211-13 (1983).
9' The African Charter on Human People's Rights ("Charter") was adopted in
1981 by the member states of the Organization of African Unity. Maka W. Mutua,
The Banjal Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the
Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339, 339 n.2 (1995). The Charter created the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights to implement the provisions of
the Charter. Id. The Charter did not create an African human rights court. James
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is there.
It has been mentioned that it should be universally known
that there is an international tribunal recognizing the rights
which are out of the reach of the local politicians or the local
parliament, and that these rights will be defended. In Ireland,
where we have had a great deal of constitutional litigation over
the years, this idea was not new. Almost ten years before the
Declaration of Human Rights, Ireland had a constitution con-
taining the same idea, the same philosophy.
You might be interested to hear that almost no foreign cases
are referred to in our jurisprudence, except for American ones.
Many of the provisions in the Irish Constitution are similar to
the American Constitution, and many of the same problems
arise.92 I would say that whatever foreign decisions are men-
tioned by an Irish court in the constitutional field, in 99 cases
out of 100, those decisions will be from the United States. We
have run the whole gamut of these types of cases, and we find
that there is a similarity of civilization and problems which is
reflected in the text of each constitution.
An example is the phrase "all men are created equal."" I
think it was Abraham Lincoln who pointed out that it does not
mean exactly that. Some people are born more advanced than
others. The phrase is a maxim, the meaning of which is quali-
fied by our interpretation of it. Equality and the protection of
equality does not mean giving everybody the same measure.
That will only perpetuate an existing equality, so that in certain
circumstances, it is permissible to help one more than another,
to try to equalize them all. It was the old Greek idea of justice,
that you treat equals equally, and you treat unequals unequally.
It remains to be seen what effect the influx of Eastern Euro-
pean cultures will have. At the moment, they all appear to be
very orthodox in following western ideas. But the European
Court has not yet had cases from Eastern Europe, so we do not
know how it will work out. Although the system itself is for
European countries, there is a certain anomaly. Turkey is a
member because about three or four square miles of Turkey re-
D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual Orientation, 18 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 16 (1994).
9 See generally BRIAN DOOLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS IN IRELAND 23-83 (3d ed. 1994) (comparing Irish and American Constitu-
tions).
'3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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side in Europe. But a country such as Israel, which is more
European than Turkey in many ways, does not qualify for mem-
bership because it is not in Europe.94
The European Court is progressing reasonably well. It
meets a minimum of one week for each month of the year. The
judges have to work what any decent tribunal would call
"unsocial hours." We work from nine in the morning until half
past seven in the evening. We even work on Saturdays. It has
been proposed that a full-time parliament court be set up in the
future, provided all thirty-three member States agree; any
change requires absolute unanimity.
It is fair to say that the European Court has been a success
in practice. Its decisions are widely publicized and quoted. To-
day, even in countries where the European Convention is not
part of the domestic law, the local judge is more than likely to
rely on European Court decisions for support when the local laws
do not address the issue at hand. Thus, in some sense, the
European Court transcends all national law.
But unlike the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg,
the European Court at Strasbourg is basically a subsidiary to all
the national courts. The Luxembourg Court is not concerned
with national courts. Thus, like many constitutions, the Stras-
bourg Court is not to be treated as a sheet coming down and as-
suming the shape of everything underneath. Rather, what is
underneath must assume the shape of what has already been set
out in the European Convention itself.
'4 Article 66 of the European Convention mandates that membership presup-
poses membership on the Council of Europe. European Convention, supra note 9. In
order to qualify as a member of the Council, countries are required to promise ad-
herence to the European Convention. Richard B. Bilder et al., The European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights: International Protection Versus Na-
tional Restrictions, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 206, 207 (1994). Indeed, at least one author
has noted that the European Convention's preamble implies that only those coun-
tries "which share common ideals and political heritage" will be accepted as mem-
bers to the Council, and therefore to the European Convention. Daniel S Sullivan,
Note, Effective International Dispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary
Condition of Liberal Democracy, 81 GEO. L.J. 2369, 2378 (1993).
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